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Abstract: Among all the global and domestic factors including systematic risk
considered, oil price has the most positive impact and is priced the most in the returns of
all the six Saudi equity sectors. The World Capital Market as represented by MSCI has
the least impact on those isolated equity sectors. The beta risk estimates for all these
sectors, while controlling for the general market, suggest that that higher risk is
compensated by greater returns. In the “up” and “down” markets, the sectors have
asymmetric risk exposure, which implies that these sectors (or those who invest in them)
inhabit an environment that requires serious hedging during the “down” market.
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Pricing Risk, Oil and Financial Factors in Saudi Sector Index Returns

1. Introduction
Until recently, The Gulf’s Arab stock markets of oil-rich countries (Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) have been one of the fastest growing
equity markets in the world. The total market capitalization of these countries has grown
from about US $132 billion at the end of 2000 to US$ 534 billion at the end of 2004. The
Saudi stock market is the largest in the region, accounting for 56% of the six Gulf’s Arab
markets and forming up one third of Arab countries’ total stock market1.
The empirical research on these stock market focuses on the general index of the
individual markets and not on the individual sectors. The research has concentrated on
three main issues: market efficiency, volatility of index returns and sensitivity to global
factors particularly the oil price. Butler and Malaikah (1992), an exception, investigate
the efficiency for Kuwaiti and Saudi individual stocks and find them not to be efficient
by any measure of efficiency. Hammoudeh & Eleisa (2004) examine the oil sensitivity at
the aggregate level for five Gulf markets including Saudi Arabia. They find that on a only
the Saudi market has a bi-directional causal or mutual predictive relationship with daily
oil price changes. However, they find that the stock returns of the smaller oil exporters
Kuwait and Oman have no causal relationships with oil price changes. Malik and
Hammoudeh (2003) use a multivariate, two-factor GARCH to investigate the conditional
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The Saudi market capitalization reached about $306 billion at the end of 2004, giving rise to a gain of
84.9% after yielding 76.3% in 2003 (Al-Shaikh, 2004). At this level, the Saudi capitalization is greater than
that of Argentine, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Singapore and
Turkey, among many others.
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volatility of the Gulf’s individual markets to both the oil price and the US three-month
Treasury bill interest rate. Islam (2004) uses a univariate GARCH to examine the
conditional volatility of market returns in the Oman market.
Stock market aggregation may mute equity index sensitivities to risk and global
factors and may hide causal relationships, making stock or sector selections more
difficult. Therefore, there is a need to revisit the findings reached at the general index
level by examining the responsiveness of sectoral index returns. Based on availability of
sectoral data, we are only able to examine six equity sectors’ sensitivities to three global
factors: oil price, the world capital market and US short-term interest rate, and to the
domestic interest rate. These sensitivities can then be compared to sectors’ own
systematic risk sensitivities. In this case, traders and investors in the Saudi market can
make more informed decisions in terms of sector section and switching when significant
shocks affect sectoral risk and the domestic and global factors involved The finding
should shed some light on whether, for example, the industrial sector is more or less
sensitive to changes in the oil price, inertest rate or systematic risk than the service or the
banking sector. This study also addresses the issue of which sector(s) perform better
during the “up” and “down” markets.
The major finding in this paper is that among all the oil and financial factors,
whether domestic or global, the oil price has the most positive impact on all the six
sectors’ returns, particularly on the returns of Electricity, Industry and Cement which all
are energy-intensive sectors. The beta risk estimates for all the sectors, suggest that that
higher general market risk is compensated by greater returns. In the “up” and “down”
markets, all the sectors have asymmetric risk exposure. Accordingly, an increase in risk
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exposure during a “down” market has significantly more negative impact on the sectoral
returns than a decrease in this exposure during an “up” market. This finding suggests that
these sectors inhabit a market that requires serious hedging to deal with the increase in
risk during the “down” market. It may also imply that companies in these sectors face a
more competitive environment during the down side and have difficulty passing risk on
to their customers. The sector that has the least negative risk exposure is Agriculture
because the shares of the companies in this sector are “defensible” stock, whereas Banks
have the most negative exposure during the “down” market. The World Capital Market
has basically no impact on those sectors which have been segmented from the world
markets by protective government regulations.

2. Data Description
The data set covers the weekly period July 9, 1994–October 14, 2004. The Saudi
stock market data includes time-series for the Tadawul all-share general index (SAUD,
thereafter) and six of its sectoral indexes: Industry, Banks, Service, Electricity,
Agriculture and Cement2. The global factor data included series for the spot price of
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil, the Morgan Stanley Capital International
index, MSCI-World, and the US short-term T-bill rate. To control for the Saudi domestic
liquidity, we include the Saudi short-term interest rate. All the variables are expressed in
log form, except the two interest rate variables. The data also includes generated time
series for the six sectors’ systematic risk relative to the Saudi aggregate market. These
risk series are the sectoral betas generated relative to the overall stock market by window-
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We chose these six sectors because of availability of adequate sectoral index data. We only excluded the
communications sector because its newly created index does not have sufficient data.
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rolling regressions on a two-month basis, as is the case in the literature, for each of the
sectors while controlling for the global factors
The original daily data span the period July 9, 1994–October 14, 2004. Because
the US capital and oil markets have Saturday and Sunday as the weekend while Saudi
Arabia has Friday as its weekend, and thus the two groups have only four days a week in
common, we opted to use weekly data and chose Tuesday as the week day for all the
variables because it is in the middle of the trading weeks for both sets of the markets3.
The general stock index Tadawul is an all-share index which is compromised of
shares of all the companies listed on the Saudi market. There were 73 companies listed in
this market in 2004, but its capacity exceeds 200 firms4. During the past decade, only 13
new companies were listed on this market. The country’s major economic powerhouses,
like Saudi Arabian Airlines , Saudi Telecom and the National Commercial Bank, with
total assets that are over 70 billion dollars, were not yet fully listed in 2004.
The Morgan Stanley Capital International index, MSCI-World (MSCI, thereafter)
is one of the three global factors used in this study. The second global factor is the WTI
spot price (WTIS) which is the price for contracts delivered at Cushing, Oklahoma centre
(Hammoudeh and Li, 2004). The short-term interest rates include the US 3-month
Treasury bill rate (USTB), as the third global factor, and the Saudi 3-month interest rate
(STB) as a domestic factor.
The data base also includes two dummy variables to account for structural breaks
in the sample period: one for the 1997 East Asian financial crisis (D97), and the other for
3

By choosing a middle of the week trading day, we aimed at avoiding the weekend effect bias. In the
United States, the weekly data is usually selected for Wednesday.
4
Among the listed companies, the Industrial sector has 26 firms, Banking 9, Agriculture 9, Cement 8,
Telecommunications 1, Electricity 1, and Service 19 (See Al-Shaikh, 2004).
4

the change in the OPEC oil price regime in 2000 (D00) from single price-targeting to
price band-targeting5. The first structural break is dated to when Thailand abandoned its
fixed exchange rate on July 2, 1997 (Hammoudeh and Li, 2004). The South Asian stock
markets collapsed as a result of this crisis, affecting stock markets in other developing
countries. The crisis also caused a drop in the demand for oil, culminating in the collapse
of oil prices in 1998. The second structural break dates back to February 1, 2000 which
occurred as a result of lifting the oil price from $19 a barrel to the $25 centre of the band.
Only D00 which also includes the collapse of the oil price in the aftermath of the Asian
crisis was found to be significant6.

3. Overview of Market Performance
The general market returned an average of 13% annualized on the basis of 52weeks over the sample period7. The industrial sector averaged an annualized return of
18.7% leading all the sectors, followed by the electricity (16.1%) and banks. Cement
yielded the lowest return averaging 8.8% annualized. However, the Saudi market and all
its sectors generated returns that are significantly higher than the 5.2% yielded by the
world market as represented by MSCI. On the other hand, the Saudi market and some of
its sectors fell short of the 11.4% rerun yielded by the WTI spot price.
The (unconditional) return volatility as measured by annualized standard
deviation is 1.154 for the Saudi market8, which is between the MSCI volatility of 1.092
5

For more information on the oil price target zones see Tang and Hammoudeh (2002).
Other structural dummies were tried but found not significant.
7
This rate of return averaged 33.5% during the period that followed the introduction of the Tadawul
trading system in October 2001, the repatriation of Saudi funds from the United States as a result of 9/11
and the drastic increases in oil prices. The table of the descriptive statistics is available upon request.
8
The Saudi market volatility increased to 1.378 during the period after October 2001. All the individual
sectors also experienced an increase in volatility during this recent period.
6
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and the S&P 500 of 1.222. The oil market has higher return volatility than those stock
markets, averaging at 2.698 annualized. Interestingly, the Saudi and US T bill rates are
significantly more volatile than the oil market because they move more closely with the
business cycles.
In terms of the generated systematic risk level, the industrial sector has on average
the highest risk of 57.72 annualized, while the service sector has the lowest (annualized
5.72). However, in terms of systematic risk volatility, Agriculture has the greatest risk
standard deviation followed by Electricity, while the service sector still has the lowest
risk volatility. As of higher moments, all the sectors with the exception of Service and
Cement are skewed to the right. This means that there is a higher probability for investors
to get positive returns from Industry, Electrify and Banking than from Service and
Cement (Harvey and Siddique, 1999).

4. Empirical Results
We use the international arbitrage price theory (APT) to investigate the roles of
the oil and financial global factors, domestic interest rate and domestic risk on the Saudi
sectoral returns. We also wish to test whether or not asymmetric sensitivity is present in
the sector return when the Saudi general market is in an up and down patterns
In the international APT model, we estimate sector systematic risks (betas) with
respect to the Saudi market (SAUD) while controlling for the sensitivities of the oil,
world capital and money markets. The following basic equations capture the individual
sector’s sensitivities to own beta risk and to the other factors in a general or aggregated
market:
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(1a)

DLYjt = β0ј + γ1j β1jt + γ2jDLWTISt + γ3jDLMSCI + γ4jSTBt + ejt
DLYjt = β0ј + γ1j β1jt + γ2jDLWTISt + γ3jDLMSCI + γ4jSTBt + γ5jUSTBt

+

ejt

(1b)

where DLYj is the weekly return for the sector j’s stock index, DLWTISt is the weekly oil
price return for the WTI oil spot price, DLMSCIt is the weekly return on the Morgan
Stanley Capital Market Index, STBt is the Saudi 3-month interest rate and USTBt is the
US 3-month T bill rate,9 where the data for the risk factor beta (β1j) is generated through
8-week rolling regression estimation process10. In equations (1), β1јt is the jth sector’s
unconditional systematic risk which is invariant regardless of the direction of change of
the Saudi market.
However, the beta risk may exhibit different behaviour depending on whether the
general market is up (down) and the market return is positive (negative). Research has
demonstrated that the unconditional systematic risk (betas) and returns may not be related
empirically due to the bias created by the combination of positive and negative returns.
Pettengil et al (1995) suggest that the general market and risk should be segregated. Thus,
we examine the relationship between sectoral returns and risk in the both up and down
markets for the all the sector while controlling for oil price changes, the World capital
market returns and US and domestic interest rates The relationship conditional on the up
and down markets for each sector is estimated for the following equations:

9

The correlation between: DLWTIS and DLMSCI is -0.048; DLWTIS and STB is 0.019; and DLMSCI
and STB is 0.019. Thus, there is no multicollinearity problem in the STB equations that do not include
USTB. The correlation is however high between STB and USTB because the Saudi currency is pegged to
the US dollar.
10
The rolling betas were generated from the rolling regressions:

DLYjt = β0ј + β1jDLSAUDt + γ1jDLWTISt + γ2jDLMSCI + γ3jSTBt + ejt
This regression was also run for 13 weeks (three months) and the results are basically the same.
7

DLYj = γ0j +γ6j*du* βј + γ7j*(1-du)*βј + γ8j*DLWTIS + γ9j*DLMSCI + γ10j*STB + ej

(2a)

DLYj = γ0j +γ6j*du* βј + γ7j*(1-du)*βј + γ8j*DLWTIS + γ9j*DLMSCI + γ10j*STB + γ11j*USTB + ej

(2b)

where du =1 if the broad market is up (DLSAUD > 0) and du = 0 if this market is down
(DLSAUD < 0). The expected sign for γ6j is positive and for γ7j is negative. If this is the
case, then it means that high-beta sectors outperform low-beta sectors when the broad
market return is positive, and similarly the high-beta sectors incur higher losses when the
realized broad market return is negative (Tang and Shum, 2003). The Wald test suggests
that estimated conditional betas in equations (2) are not symmetric between up and down
markets for all the industry/country returns (test results are available upon request). Thus,
in the “up” and “down” markets, all the sectors have asymmetric risk exposure.
Accordingly, an increase in risk exposure during a “down” market has significantly more
negative impact on the sectoral returns than a decrease in this exposure during an “up”
market (see Table 1). This finding suggests that these sectors inhabit a market that
requires serious hedging to deal with the increase in risk during the “down” market. It
may also imply that companies in these sectors face a more competitive environment
during the down side and have difficulty passing risk on to their customers. The sector
that has the least negative risk exposure is Agriculture because the shares of the
companies in this sector are “defensible” stock, whereas Banks have the most negative
exposure during the “down” market.
In terms of sensitivity to the oil price, the sectors can be grouped into three
categories. The first category includes the sectors that are directly oil-sensitive in the
general market with ups or downs, namely Banks, Industry, Services and Electricity.
8

Banks and Services are directly impacted by the liquidity created by higher oil prices.
Industry and Electricity are also directly affected by the oil boom, but they are heavy
users of petroleum as an input whether as a raw material or as a fuel.
The second category includes the sectors that are oil-sensitive only when the
general stock market is divided into up and down markets. This category includes the
Service sector which is the least sensitive to total and systematic risks. The third category
includes the sectors that are not directly oil-sensitive, regardless whether market is
aggregated or divided into up and down markets. This category includes Agriculture and
Cement. These relatively small sectors are mainly influenced by market risk and
government loans.
It is not surprising in this highly segmented stock market which usually flourishes
on higher oil price that none of the sectors is sensitive to changes in the world capital
market as represented by MSCI, whether in the aggregate level representation or when
the market is categorized into the up and down patterns. Moreover, more than 25% of the
stocks are traded by few hands such as the government and rich families which control
when to buy and when to sell. But this market is highly sensitive to regional factors
including security and political uncertainty The banks demonstrate particular sensitivity
to political and economic events such as collapse of the oil price in 1999 in the aftermath
of the 1997 Asian crisis, and the change in the oil pricing mechanism in 2000 as shown
by the effect of the dummy variable D0011.
In contrast to the US Treasury bill rate, changes in domestic interest rates
negatively affect most of the sectors. While the interest rate affects the Service sector at
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OPEC unofficially adopted the oil price band of $22-28 a barrel in February 2001 (see Tang and
Hammoudeh, 2002)
9

the aggregate and up markets, the impact is greater on Banks and Industry as expected. It
should be mentioned that the Cement sector is also sensitive to domestic interest rate
regardless whether the market is aggregated or it moves up or down. This could be
related to the fact that construction is financed by domestic loans. Only the banking and
cement sectors are sensitive to US T- bill rate. While it is obvious why Saudi banks are
sensitive to the US bill rate, it is harder to explain why the cement sector is sensitive to
this global variable as well.
The most consistent sector sensitivity is to changes in domestic systematic risks.
Industry, Electricity and Agriculture are sensitive to changes in the unconditional risk,
but all the sectors are compensated in higher returns for the conditional risk in both the up
and down markets. This means that investors require extra compensation for investing in
the market. Since the sign for the up beta is positive and that for the down beta is
negative as expected, then it means that sectors with high-beta sensitivity such as
Industry, Electricity and Cement should outperform low-beta sectors such as Agriculture
and Banks when the Saudi aggregate market return is positive. Similarly the high-beta
sectors incur higher losses when this market return is negative, and thus those sectors
should be avoided in the case of lower oil prices which usually determine the direction of
the overall economy and the market for Saudi Arabia (Fasano and Iqbal, 2003). But the
major result is that the impact of the change in the oil price is much more priced in
returns by investors and traders than the impacts of both the conditional and
unconditional systematic risk for all sectors.
Analyzing the estimates when the sample period is divided into two subperiods,
dated before and after the end of 2001 which corresponds to the change in the pricing
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mechanism by OPEC, the sensitivity to systematic risk for the up market has increased
considerably for Services and Electricity in the second subsample which comes after
September 11th, and has witnessed the 2003 Iraq war and the record increases in oil price
after that. On the down side of the market, the systematic risk has increased for all
sectors, particularly Electricity. Thus the electricity power sector has increased risk
sensitivity in both the up and down markets. Since all the sectors have asymmetric
systematic risk exposure,

5. Conclusions
Traders who are interested in investing in oil-sensitive stocks in Saudi Arabia may
during high oil prices select stocks of companies operating in high beta sectors such as
Industry, Electricity and Cement because the oil price is significantly more priced in
these sectors than the others.
Since all the sectors have asymmetric systematic risk exposure in the “up” and
“down” markets, this finding suggests that these sectors inhabit a stock market that
requires serious hedging in order to deal with the increase in risk during the “down”
market. It may also imply that companies in these sectors face a more competitive
environment during the “down” side and have difficulty passing on risk to their
customers. Traders may select stocks in the Agricultural sector during the down markets,
because this sector has the least negative risk exposure as the shares of its companies are
“defensible” stock. On the other hand, they should avoid shares of the Banking sector
which has the most negative exposure during the “down” market.
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Trader should also be aware that systematic risk in the Saudi market has increased
since the end of 2001 which comes on the back of 9/11 and has witnessed the impact of
the continuing 2003 Iraq war. Risk exposure has increased for Service in the “down”
market and for Electricity in both “up” and “down” markets.
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Table 1:
Oil and beta Risk Exposures in the Sectoral Risk-Return Relationships
Equation

Beta

Up Beta Down Beta Oil price
0.0348c

Banks ¶ (1a) 0.0003
¶ (1b) 8.5E-05

0.0352
a

(2a)

0.0077

(2b)
Industry

0.0075
0.044

-0.0184
-0.0184

a

b

0.0046

Service

a

a

0.0108

a

0.0109

a

-0.0139

0.0143

-0.0108
c

0.0273

0.0027

0.0082

a

0.02951

0.0091

0.0004

-0.0151

0.0299

0.0129

-0.0023

-0.0121

a

-0.0121

a

-0.0036

0.0102 a -0.0142 a
-0.0142

a

-0.0003
-0.0008

c
b

0.0085
0.0074

b

-0.0063

-0.0002

0.0074

b

-0.0064

-0.0002

-0.0032

0.0697
0.0700 b

0.0172
0.0213

-0.0017

0.0242

-0.0249

-0.0011

0.0244

-0.0219

-0.0031

-0.0046

0.0490

-0.0557

-0.0024

0.0029 a

0.0492

-0.0531

-0.0042

0.0414

-0.0628

-0.0020 b

0.0416

-0.0612

-0.0032

0.0045 a -0.0052 a
0.0045

a

-0.0053

a

0.0004

0.0271

0.0008

0.0275
0.0112
0.0114

a

-0.0117

a

-0.0112

a

0.0086
0.0090

0.0554
0.0625
0.0403
0.0446

-0.0062

a

-0.0007

c

-0.0036

c

2.01

-0.0057

0.04

1.90

-0.0059

a

0.04

1.91

n.s.

0.03

1.88

n.s.

0.04

1.89

n.s.

0.34

2.03

n.s.

0.34

2.03

n.s.

0.04

2.10

n.s.

0.04

2.10

n.s.

0.19

2.18

-1.26e-5

n.s.

0.19

2.18

n.s.

0.02

1.89

0.0032

n.s.

0.02

1.89

n.s.

0.02

1.89

0.0023

n.s.

0.02

1.89

n.s.

0.04

2.05

0.0021

n.s.

0.04

2.05

n.s

0.07

2.05

n.s.

0.07

2.05

n.s.

0.02

1.70

n.s

0.03

1.71

n.s

0.26

1.72

n.s.

0.26

1.73

0.0058

0.0005

0.0013

-0.0011

0.03

2.01

a

b

DW

0.03

0.0027

b

0.0058
0.0033

n.s.

R2

b

c

a

Agriculture 0.0029

0.0052

c

0.0030
a

b

b

0.0102

a

a

a

a

-0.0016

a

-0.0153

0.0084
0.0082

-0.0031

c

-0.0067

8.14E-

b

-0.307

0.0346

b

a

-0.0054

0.0415

0.0026a

Cement

0.0224

Saudi interest US interest D00
rate
rate
-0.0008
n.s.

a

0.00057

Electricity

0.0173

c

0.0139
0.0409

a

MSCI

Notes: Equations (1a) to (2b) are defined in the text. Superscripts a, b and c represent levels of significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively. n.s. means not significant.
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